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I. Introduction
Most development  economists agree that variations in world prices are an imnportant  source of risk and
instability  for developing  economies. Developing  counaies derive about half their export earnings from
primary  commodities,  whose world prices are extremely  volatile. Nor is such volatility  purely short-term:
mauch  data suggest that commodity prices undergo long periods of rise and decline.  To provide one
example  of the magnitudes  involved,  the World Bank's index of non-oil commodity prices has exhibited
a trend decline  of about 1.5%  per annum since 1948,  cumulating  to a 50% decline  over 45 years. Over the
next decade, the World Bank is forecasting  that this trend will reverse and there will be a rise of about
0.7% per annum.  What is the impact of these long-run movements in the external terms of trade on
economic  .growth and development?
We think that the world has provided a natural experiment  over the past 25 years that can be used to
analyze  this issue. Oil-exporting  developing  countries  experienced  a major rise in the world price of their
main export between 1973  and 1981, followed  by a smaller,  but still substantial,  decline  between 1981  and
1989. Nominal  oil prices rose from $2.70 in 1973 to $34.31  in 1981,  and then fell back to $16.31  in 1989;
deflating  this by US producer  prices, real oil prices rose from an index of 1.0 in 1973 to 5.83 in 1981 and
2.42 in 1989. From a research  standpoint,  we think that this episode represents a fortunate opportunity  to
better understand  the impact of terms-of-trade  shocks, for the following  reasons.
First, it seems  important  to distinguish  between permanent  and tansitory, or anticipated  and unanticipated
changes in the terms of trade, and we believe that oil prices come closer than any other data to measuring
an unanticipated permanent  change. The 1973 rise was not anticipated several years before, and it was
quickly and widely perceived as a permanent feature of the economic landscape.  The long declinepage 2
beginning  in 1981  was also  not  widely  anticipated;  it probably  took  longer  for it to be accepted  as a long-
run  phenomenon,  but at least  by 1986,  when  oil prices  fell  by 25%,  the 1981  levels  were long  considered
a thing of the past. Hence,  it is credible  that the major  long run changes  in oil prices  were  previously
unanticipated  events  that were  widely  viewed  to be permanent  once  they  occurred.
Second,  the time  span  of the rise  and  decline  in oil prices  is fairly  long-8  or 9 years-so that  it is credible
to believe  that we  can observe  long-run  effects. Third,  the movements  in oil prices  were large. Hence,
there is much statistical  variation,  and if effects  are present,  we should  be able to estimate  them more
efficiently. Fourth,  terms-of-trade  changes  were so dominant  for these  countries  over this period  that
deciding  what variables  to control  for, so as to avoid omitted  variable  bias, should  constitute  less of a
problem
Fifth,  we have both a rise and a decline  in oil prices, so that we can try to detect  asymmetries  in the
responses. Sixth, measurement  problems  associated  with index numbers  are less of an issue for oil
exporters,  since  oil is a relatively  homogeneous  product Seventh,  simultaneity  between  the terms  of trade
and domestic  economic  variables,  while  not always  absent,  is at least  a tractable  problem  because  there  is
a fair  consensus  about  the causes  of the  major  oil price  movements.  Further,  for many  of the countries  and
most  of the variables  we examine,  it seems  reasonable  to view  the terms  of trade  as predetermined.
Our broad  conclusion  is that an examination  of the data  for oil exporters  leads to a different  picture  of
terms-of-trade  effects  than can be obtained  from an unbiased  sample  of terms-of-trade  articles  in the
literature.  We  find  that the impact  on investment  is crucial  to understanding  the response  of the current
account  to, and  the long-run  growth  effects  of,  terms-of-trade  shocks;  yet  the  literature  is filled  with  current
account  models  that  hold investment  constant,  and long-run  trade  models  that treat the capital  stock  as an
endowment  which  is unaffected  by terms-of-trade  shocks.  Conversely,  Dutch  disease  effects  are  examined
extensively  in the literature,  but we  fail  to find  any  evidence  that  the  Dutch  disease  is a major  phenomenon.
We  also  find  that  the simple  insights  fmm  the tradables-nontradables  model  are well  supported  by the  data.
Finally,  we find  that the response  of expenditure  to terms-of-trade  shocks  is not very  sensitive  to whether
the expenditure  comes  from  the public  or private  sector.page 3
The rest of the paper  is divided  as follows. Section  II summarizes  the relevant  theoretical  literature  and
empirical  studies. Section  m contains  a description  of the data. Section  IV sets out the econometric
framework  and  analyses  some  importnt econometric  issues. Section  V presents  the  main  results. Section
VI discusses  some  criticisms.  Section  VII  concludes.
II. Theoretical  Jiterature  and empirical  studies
For expository  purposes,  we  find  it useful  to divide  the  theoretical  literature  on the  impact  of terms-of-trade
shocks  into two broad groups. One class of models  is microeconomnic  in nature and stresses the differing
effects of terms-of-trade  shocks  on different  sectors  of the economy. Examples  include  the tradables-
nontradables  models  originated  by Meade,  Salter  (1959),  and Swan;  the Dutch  Disease  models  found  in,
say, Wijubergen  (1984, 1984b)  and Neary  & Wijnbergen  (1984),  and summarized  in Corden  & Neary
(1982)  and Corden  (1984);  and the computable  general  equilibrium  model  of Bruno  & Sachs  (1982).
A second  class  is  concermed  with  the behavior  of broad  macroeconomic  aggregates,  particularly  saving  and
the current  account,  and  recently  has tended  to stress  intertemporal  issues. A partial  reference  list for this
literature  includes  Laursen  & Metzler  (1950),  Harberger  (1950),  Obstfeld  (1982),  Persson  & Svensson
(1985),  and Bean  (1986).
A. Sectoral  Effects
Many  of the insights  from  the earlier  literature  stressing  sectoral  disaggregation  can  be obtained,  following
Corden,  by thinldng  in terms  of a thee-sector,  perfectly  competitive  neoclassical  model,  with fixed  total
factor  endowments.  Let  the first  sector  (0) produce  oil for  export;  let the second,  'Dutch  Disease'  sector
(D)  produce  all other  tradables,  both exportables  and importables;  and let the third  sector  (N)  produce  non-
tradables. The  first two  sectors  produce  tradables  at given  world  prices,  and the difference  between  the
quantity supplied and demanded  is made up by exports or imports; the price of nontradables  is
endogenously  detwrmined  by the condition  that  their  supply  equal  their demand. Assume  first  that output
in each  sector  is  produced  by  a factor  specific  to tluht  sector,  and  by labor,  which  is mobile  between  all three
sectors  and moves  between  sectors  to equalize  its wage  in all three  employments.page 4
Now  let there  be an oil price  shock. The  direct  effect  is to increase  the aggregate  incomes  of the factors
initially  employed  in 0, which in turn has two effects. First, if some  part  of the extra income  is spent,
whether  directly  by factor  owneis  or indirectly  through  being  collected  in taxes and then spent  by the
govenunent,  and  provided  the income  elasticity  of demand  for N is positive,  demand  for  N rises. Given
less than perfectly  elastic  supply.  the price  of N relative  to tradables  must  rise. That is, there  is a real
appreciation  which  draws  resources  out  of 0 and D into N. This  is the spending  effect. In addition,  the
price increase  raises  the marginal  value  product  of factors  in O so that, at a constant  wage  in tenns of
tradables,  the demand  for labor  in 0 rises, inducing  a movement  of labor out of D and N. This is the
resource  movenen  effect. The  output  of D must finally  be lower  than  before  the shock,  while  the output
of N could  be higher  or lower,  the spending  effect  tends  to increase  it, the resource  movement  effect  to
decrease  it.
Assume  now,  as is common,  that  the oil sector  does  not  in fact  employ  any factors  that can  be used  by the
rest of the economy.  Here,  the oil sector  is an 'enclave'  which  does not participate  in domestic  factor
markets.  There  is then  only a spending  effect,  and the key mechanism  of resource  reallocation  is the real
appreciation.  Provided  spending  on nontradables  initially  goes  up,  output  of N must  finally  be higher  than
in the pre-shock  situation.
Assume  instead  that more  than one factor  is mobile  between  at least  two of our  three  main  sectors. For
instance,  say  that  capital  is also  mobile  between  D and  N, so that these  two sectors,  employing  labor  and
capital  in different  proportions,  make  up a mnini-Heckscher-Ohlin  economy.  Now  the resource  movement
effect  can  have  paradoxical  result. Because  of the  price  shock,  labor  moves  out of this  mini-economy  into
0.  If  D is the  capital-intensive  industry,  its output  could  on balance  expand. If N is capital-intensive,  the
shock  could  cause  a real  depreciation.
At this stage  it is useful  to compare  the predictions  of this neoclassical  model  with a Keynesian  model.
In the neoclassical  model,  with factors  fixed in the short  run, and full employment  determining  output
through  the production  functions,  there  is no scope  for 'aggregate  output'  to change  much:  the shock  can
at most change  the composition  of output. However,  in a Keynesian  economy  with sticky  prices, the
demand  stimulus  can  raise  aggregate  output  even  in the short  run.page  5
Regarding  longer-term  supply-side  effects,  the neoclassical  framework  predicts  that  these  hinge  crucially
on the relative  price  signals. Reproducible  factors,  such  as physical  and human  capital,  will accumulate
in  sectors  whose  relative  prices  rise  following  the terms-of-trade  improvement  (more  precisely,  the relevant
price  is a product  price  adjusted  for  movements  in input  prices,  that  is, a value  added  price). As we  have
seen,  the relative  prices  in 0 and N typically  rise in the short run, and thus  factors  accumulate  in these
sectors,  expanding  output in the longer  run.  By contrast,  capital  will shift out of, or be allowed  to
depreciate  without  replacement,  in D.
B. Macroeconomic  effects
Tuning now  to the macroeconomic  literature,  early  analyses,  conducted  within  the  framework  of the  static
Keynesian  saving  and investment  functions,  include  Laursen  & Metzler  (1950)  and  Harberger  (1950).  The
driving  mechanism  is that  terms-of-trade  shocks  affect  real income,  and  hence  savings.  Given  investment,
this determines  the evolution  of the  current  account.  Later  research,  typified  by Obstfeld  (1982),  Persson
& Svensson  (1985),  and Sen & Turnovsky  (1989),  is based  on neoclassical  models,  typically  involving
dynamic  optimization.  Terms-of-trade  shocks  alter  permanent  income,  intratemporal  and intertemporal
relative  prices,  and hence  affect  consumption,  saving,  and investment.  One  conclusion  to emerge  from  this
literature  is that the effects  depend  critically  upon whether  the shock  is permanent  or temporary,  and
anticipated  or urnanticipated.
Let  us first  consider  the possible  impact  of a permanent,  unanticipated  increase  in the terms  of trade  on
consumption.  The  shock  increases  both  current  and permanent  income. All models  therefore  predict  an
increase  in aggregate  consumption.  In sectoral  terms,  consumption  of oil  is probably  insignificant  for  our
sample, and consumption  of other tradables must rise through income effects.  Consumption  of
nontradables  must  equal  production,  which  was  discussed  above.
Investment  is treated  as exogenous  by much  of the literature.  Older  Keynesian  models  often  postulate  a
simple accelerator  mechanism  whereby  the shock raises expected  demand and hence investment.
Optimizing  models  usually  conclude  that aggregate  private investment  is determined  by the ratio of
Tobin's  q (the  present  discounted  value  of future  marginal  products  of capital)  to the aggregate  investment
price deflator. Assuming  that capital  goods  have  a strong  import  content,  the shock  boosts domesticpage 6
investment-Schmidt-Hebbel  & Serven  (1993). Yet most  models  treat  investment  goods  as dcmestically
produced,  and hence  obtain  far more ambiguous  result-Persson  & Svensson  (1985).  Sen & Turnovsky
(1989). For  developing  economies,  the former  assumption  appears  to be correct.
Three  factors  may  however  reduce  the incentive  to invest. First,  profits  may  be captured  by unions  (rent-
sharing). Yet  many  of these  countries  lack  an organized  labor  movement.  Second,  in OPEC  countries
production  quotas  may  be seen  as a permanent  ceiling  on oil production,  leaving  little reason  to invest  in
the  oil sector's  productive  capacity.  On the  other  hand,  an increase  in such  capacity  might  strengthen  one's
hand in the periodic  quota  negotiations;  also, there is stil an incentive  for cost-reducing  investment.
Finally,  increased  wealth  may  encourage  consumption  of leisure,  and a contraction  in labor supply  will
reduce  the marginal  product  of capital;  see Bean (1986),  Sen & Turnovsky  (1989). Yet  many  of these
countries  face  an extremely  elastic  supply  of potential  immigrant  workers.
Regarding  the current  account,  Laursen  & Metzler  postulated  that the shock by raising real income,
increases  savings.  For a given investment,  this increases  the current account.  In an optimizing
intertemporal  framework,  with domestically  produced  investment  goods,  Obstfeld  (1982)  and Svensson
& Razin  (1983)  showed  that  with  a constant  rate  of time  preference  the  economy  should  jump immediately
to its new steady state, with no effect  on the current  account. If instead  the rate of time preference
decreases  with  utility,  there  is a transitory  rise  in savings  and current  account  surplus. On the other  hand,
if investment  requires  imports  of capital  machinery,  it may be encouraged  by the shock, leading  to a
temporary  current  account  deficit.
C. Empirical Studies
Warner  (1992)  examined  whether  the international  debt crisis  which  began  in 1982  could explain  the
investment  decline  in 14 heavily  indebted  countries. He found  that equations  which  omitted  all debt-
related  information,  but  incorporated  the  effects  of falling  export  prices  and high  world  real  interest  rates,
could forecast  the fall  in investment.  This  suggests  the importance  of the terms  of trade  in determining
investment.
Warner  (1994)  proposed  and estimated  a microeconomic  investment  model to determine  the relative
importance  for  Mexico's  investment  decline  in the early  1980's  of three  explanations:  the  oil price  decline,page 7
the terriination  of capital  inflows,  and  debt-overhang/uncertainty  effects. Using  quarterly  investment  data
for  68 private-sector  industries  between  1981  and 1985,  he found  that  the  main  mirroeconomic  mechanism
driving  the investment  decline  was  the rise  in the  relative  price  of imported  investment  goods,  and further
that the terms  of trade  decline  (driven  by falling  world  oil prices)  explains  much  of the increase  in this
relative  price.
Morley  (1992)  examined  stabilization  programs  in a broad  sample  of LDC's. Using  panel  data,  he found
that  the terms  of trade  had a significant  positive  impact  on investnent  and output. The same  was true of
real appreciations,  which  as we  have  argued  are a likely  consequence  of terms-of-trade  shocks.
Etherington  & Yainshet  (1988),  using  time-series  methodology,  found  that the price of coffee,  the key
Ethiopian  export,  had a significant  positive  impact  on Ethiopian  capital  good  imports  and  domestic  capital
formation.
De Gregorio  (1992)  analyzed  growth  determinants  in twelve  Latin  American  countries  over the period
1950-1985.  Controlling  for  investment  and macroeconomic  stability,  he did not find  a significant  effect
of the terms  of trade  on growth.  However,  he did not  consider  that investment  itself  might  be affected  by
the terms  of trade.
III. The Data
We  consider  the period 1965-1989.  Our sample  consists  of the following  18  oil-exporting  countries:
Algeria  Gabon  Mexico  Trinidad  and  Tobago
Bahrain  Indonesia  Nigeria  United  Arab  Emirates
Congo  Iran  Oman  Venezuela
Ecuador  Iraq  Saudi  Arabia
Egypt  Kuwait  Syria
For each country,  on the expenditure  side we examined  data on consumption  and investment  (by the
private  sector,  by the government,  and  in the aggregate),  savings,  the  trade  balance,  and  GDP.  At a sectoral
level, we analyzed  value added  in the oil sector  and the non-oil  sector. The non-oil  sector  was further
broken  down  into  the following  categories:  agriculture,  manufacturing,  construction,  public  utilities,  andpage 8
services.  Services  were  in tum disaggregated  into transportation  & communications,  wholesale  & retail
trade, and other services. Tradables  are probably  most appropriately  identified  with agriculture  and
manufacturing,  nontradables  with  the other  non-oil  categories.  All  the above  variables  were  in per capita,
constant  local  currency  terms.  As  explanatory  variables,  we used  data  on the terms  of trade,  a debt  crisis
dummy,  and the world  real interest  rate.  All variables  were  at an annual  frequency.  A full  description  of
the data  used  and its sources  is in Appendix  1.
IV. Econometric  framework  and issues.
A. Estimation
Throughout,  we  use  a panel  ier  than  a time-series  methodology  since,  if the underlying  assumptions  are
satisfied,  this allows  for  more  precise  estimates  and renders  omitted  variable  bias  a less  serious  problem
(see  next  sub-section).  We  have  no strong  priors,  and  dteory  provides  little  guidance  on the  speed  at which
our variables  adjust  to terms-of-trade  shocks. Therefore  we  take  what  we think  is a flexible  approach  to
the issue  of dynamics.  As  a first  pass,  we try  to pick out long-ran  relationships  by selecting  years  when
sufficient time has passed under a given regime for the countries  to be in long-run  equilibrium.
Specifically,  we  note  that 1973  was  the end  of a long  period  of stable  oil prices;  in 1981,  after  eight  years
of rising  prices,  agents  geneally  accepted  the higher  prices  as prmanent,  and had  had some  time  to adjust
to them;  in 1989,  after  an eight-year  period  of falling  prices,  agents  likewise  accepted  and had had some
time  to adjust  to the lower  prices;  and,  after 1989,  oil  prices  rosr.  sharply  around  the time  of the Gulf  War.
Thus in 1973, 1981,  and 1989  the countries  in our sample  could arguably  have achieved  long-run
equilibrium.  We  therefore  use these  three  benchmark  years  to carty  out fixed-effects  estimation  of the
following  panel  regression  equation:
y  -t  a  t,+  TOT,+ en  ,  (1)
where  y denotes  the natural  log  of each  of the variables  we  study  (except  for  the trade  balance,  which  is
left  in levels),  TOT  denotes  the  log  of the terms  of trade,  the i subscript  refers  to countries,  and t refers  topage 9
time. The elasticity  of each variable with  ruspect to t  toerms  of trde  is given  by P. The regression  results
are given  in Appendix  11,  table 1.
In addition,  we also  use the full data  set to carry  out fixed-effects  estimation  of the following  regression
equation,  which  allows  for lagged  responses:
y  - g +  ITOT1 + P2TOTIr, + yCO)  OL 1, + e(,  !2)
where  CONTROL  denotes  the control  variables,  which  potentially  include  the debt crisis  dummy  and the
world  real interest  rate. Because  there  is little  theoretical  guidance  available  on when  and whether  we
should  include  the debt crisis  dummy,  we  excluded  it where  it was  insignificant.  The  results  for the world
real interest rate were hard to interpret,  and we always  excluded  it.  The only exception  were the
investment  equations  where,  given  the strong  theoretical  priors,  we always  controlled  for the debt crisis
and for  the world  real interest  rate. The  short-run  elasticity  of each  variable  with respect  to the tens  of
trade  is given  by J,,  the steady-state  elasticity  by (P, + N3).  The regression  results  are given  in Appendix
II, table  2, and are discussed  in the next  section.
Note  that  our  specification  of equations  (1)  and (2)  makes  e  important  assumptions.  First,  the random
efrors  es,  have  zero  mean  and are  i.i.d.  over  time  and  across  countries.  Second,  the  intercept  a varies  across
countries  (but not over time),  so that there are  country-specific  cffects. I subject  this hypothesis  to the
following  Laange  Multiplier  test,  due  to Breuisch  & Pagan  (1980). Let a be a random  term  with  cross-
country  variance  a..  Let the null hypothesis  be that there are no country-specific  effects,  that is,
Ho: a.  =0,  versus  HI: a.  > 0.  Let e,t  denote  the residuals  from the standard  OLS regression  with
homogeneous  intercepts.  Under  Ho,  the test  statistic
LAM  - N T  I3  d  X21).
2(T-1)  iSpage 10
The asymptotic  P-values  are  reported  in Appendix . In all regressions,  LM is significant  at the .0001%
level; we therefore  reject the null. Note that,  since the test statistic  has a block-diagonal  information
matrix,  this  pre-test  does not affect  the standard  errors  of the other  estimators  we  compute.
Third, we assume  that the elasticities  with respect  to the terms  of trade  (the p coefficients)  are constant
over time and across  countries. We  test both  of these  hypotheses.  To  investigate  temporal  stability,  we
split up the sample  into the subperiods  1965-1980  and 1981-1989;  since  they  roughly  correspond  to the
periods  of rising  and  of failing  terms  of trade,  this  also  allows  us  to check  whether  the  responses  to positive
and to negative  terms-of-trade  shocks  differ. As detailed  in Appendix  IL table 3, the null  hypothesis  of
identical  b  coefficients  across  the two subperiods  is generally  supported  by the F-test  described  in Hsiao
(1986),  chapter  2.2,  equation  2.2.20;  where  the differences  across  subperiods  are statistically  significant,
they are typically  quantitatively  unimportant.  This  suggests  there  are no significant  asymmetries  in the
response  to rising  and to falling  terms  of uade.
In contrast,  as detailed  in Appendix  m, the  null  hypothesis  of stability  across  countries  is always  rejected
at the 1%  significance  level  by the F-test  described  in Hsiao  (1986),  chapter  2.2,  equation  2.2.15. The
rejection  is hardly  surprising,  given  that we  are  dealing  with  such  a broad  sample  of countries,  but it does
imply that we must look at country-specific  regressions  to determine  how representative  the panel
estimates  are. These  country-by-country  regressions  are accordingly  presented  in Appendix  m.
Finally,  note  that our  fixed-effects  estimator  is only  BLUE  if we  interpret  the country-specific  effects  a1
as fixed  regressors.  To forecast  an out-of-sample  response  to a terms-of-trade  shock,  we  must  however
treat the a%'s  as random  errors;  our estimator  is then in general  not BLUE,  but is still preferable  to the
random-effects  estimator  since  it is consistent  even when  the az's are correlated  with the explanatory
variables.
B. Omitted  variable bias
The  issue  of bias  from  omitted  variables  needs  to be treated  differently  in a panel  context.  To see  this,  it
is convenient  to define  the mean  across  time  for  any given  country  and variable,  x, as:page 11
Xi  - (4)
and the deviations  from country-means as:
Xs  X.  -X.  (5)
Re-written  in terms of deviation data, equation (1) then becomes
YU,-  pTOT,+  1 . (6)
Say that the true model is instead given by
.=  . PTOT,,  yOAM  + X  ,  - (7)
If equation (5) were estimated by OLS for each country, the bias b; in our estimator of  tating  the
regressors as fixed, would be
T
E  T6Tt ,  y O°MEDI(
,bf  T  (8)
E  ToT2
Hence, a necessary  and sufficient  condition  for the countrty-by-county  OLS estimates  of  i to be consistent
is that asymptotically  the terms of trade be orthogonal  to any omitted variables:
Al.  lim(T--)  b,r = 0.page 12
Now say  that equation  (5)  is estimated  in a panel  context. The  bias in ouLr  estmator of P is then
Ir  r
E  7T&T *  y 0MJZTAD,,
b;  I1  .1  Ir  (9)
T  6T
- t*ib-  I I  (10)
Hence, a necessary  and sufficient  condition  for the panel esfimates  of p to be consistent  is that
asymptotically  a weighted  average  of the country-specific  biases  be zero:
A:2.  lim(T--) F,,aTUb  r = 0.
Clearly,  Al implies  A2 but  not  the reverse:  there  are  many  ways  for  assumption  A2 to be satisfied  without
any of the countries  individually  satisfying  assumption  Al.  The important  point is that for the panel
estimates  to be consistent,  it is unnecessary  for  the terms  of trade  to be asymptotically  orthogonal  to the
omitted  variables  in any  country:  what  matters  is that  the country-specfic  asymptotic  biases  be negatively
correlated  across  countries  so that they  average  to zero. This latter  assumption  is more  credible  to the
extent  that the relationship  between  the omitted  variables  and  the terms of trade  is idiosyncratic  to each
country  and not  positively  correlated  across  countries.
Of course,  to the  extent  that  the omitted  variables  are world  variables  which  affect  all countries,  then  the
b;  terms  will tend to have  the same  signs  and assumption  A2 may  fail. We  therefore  control  for the debt
crisis  and  for  world  interst rates. Et  might  also  be desirable  to control  for world  output,  but since  periods
of rising  oil prices  coincided  with changes  in OECD  activity  that would  have depressed  growth  in our
sample,  and  vice-versa,  this  would  probably  strengthen  the links  we  find  between  terms-of-trade  changes
and activity  variables.page 13
The additional  issue of the weights, a,, is unlikely  to be important  for our sample. Countries have larger
than average  weights to the extent that the sample variability of their terms-of-trade  data is larger than
average. Since our sample consists of oil exporters,  the variability  of their terms of trade is similar.
C.  Non-stationarity
There are two ways to inltpret our econometric  model. Frst, we may view the terms of trade (which are
driven mainly by the oil price) as a fixed regressor.  Equations (1) and (2) are then the mechanism
generating  the rest of the data. The presence  or absence of stationarity  is not an issue in this framework.
Altemvatively,  we may treat the terms of trade as being generated  by some time-series statistical model.
Here, the order of integration  of our data is an issue. Unfortunately,  little is known about how to test for
and deal with nonsaionarity  in a panel data setting. When estimating equation (2) for each country in
isolation,  we carry  out an EngleGranger co-inwgration  test, using the augmented  Dickey-Fuller statistics.
For most countries  and many variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis  that the regression residuals
are integrated  of order 1. However, given that such tests are well known for their very low power, and
given the paucity of observations  at the single-country  level,  we do not feel there is much strong evidence
that our data is non-stationary  in the sense that it trends over time.
V. Results
A. The importance of Investment
Overall,  we find fairly strong  evidence  that the relationship  between  terms-of-trade  shocks and investment
is positive.  The panel regression suggests the 95% confidence  interval (0.500,0.675) for the long-run
elasticity. In country  by country  regressions,  14 of the 18 countries  have positive  elasticities and of the 14,
13 are stastically significant This section  examines what the available  evidence says about the sectoral
breakdown and the causes of  this investment effect, and how this investment effect is crucial to
understanding  other effects such as those on the trade balance and on growth.page 14
It is likely  that much  of this investmnent  occurred  in the nontradable  sector of the economy. Although data
on investment  by sector  is simply  not available  for most  of these countries,' and therefore  this claim cannot
be supported directly,  much of the otber  data we do have  is supportive. First, there  is strong evidence that
the relative  price  of nontradables  were positively  associated  with the terms-of-trade  shocks. So there seems
to have been a clear price incentive  for investment  in these sectors. Second, we do have evidence that in
the long run output expanded in nontradable  sectors such as construction and transportation. It seems
reasonable to think that this rise was made possible  by a higher capital stock in these sectors.
This investment  effi-  in nontradables  can be explained  formally in a variety of intertemporal  optimizing
models of investment (recent examples in the literue  include Schmidt-Hebbel  & Serven (1993) and
Warner (forthcoming, 1994)).  These models usually conclude that aggregate private investment is
determined by the ratio of Tobin's q (the present discounted value of future marginal value products of
capital in a given sector) to the relevant price deflator for investment goods. Since the countries in our
sample import many  capital  goods, and the world prices  of capital goods did not change  dramatically  over
the period,  the price of nontradables  relative to physical  capital probably rose in the 1970's and declined
in the 1980's, causing similar changes in investment  in the nontradable sector.
Tuming to the oil sector,  one might think that  relative  price changes  would also stimulate  investment  there.
Although  this would  probably hold for countries  experiencing  exogenous changes  in their export prces,
it is important  to remember  that OPEC raised oil prices  in the 1970's partly through a deliberate policy of
output restriction,  so that for much of our period the oil sector was engineering  price changes rather than
passively responding  to them.  In such a setting, where countries exercise their power in the world oil
market,  it is a priori  unclear which  way the incentives  work for investment  in the oil sector. Oil production
quotas may be seen as a permanent  ceiling  on oil production,  leaving little reason to invest. On the other
band, an increase in productive capacity may strengthen one's hand in the periodic  quota negotiations.
X  An exception  is  Wamer  (1994),  where  it is shown  that  investment  in Mexican  private  non-tradables  did  decline
over 1981-85.  That  study  also suggests  that  an important  mechanism  for the investment  decline  was the fall in the
ratio  of nontradable  pnces  to imported  equipment  prices,  and  that  the  terms-of-trade  decline  can  explain  most  of the
reduction  in this  relative  price.page 15
Therefore, we cannot deduce from theoly whether investment should have risen or declined in the oil
sector.
We do know  that real oil output per capita did not rise over the long run between 1973  and 1981. It may
be that  countries invested in modernizing  the oil sector rather than in expanding its capacity. It may also
be that they did invest in expanding  capacity but just did not use this capacity fully over the period. We
simply  do not have the data to pin this down very precisely.
However, it is clear that overall investment responded positively to the terms of trade, and this helps
explain why the trade balance  was strongly negatively related to terms-of-trade  shocks, even though the
export price effect in isolation should cause a higher trade surplus.
B.  Consumption, Savings, and the Current  Account
As discussed above, tory  suggests that after a permanent positive terms-of-trade  shock, consumption
should rise, and savings should as a first approximation be unaffected. The data broadly confirms these
implications.  The only exceptions  were Ecuador,  Egypt, Syria,  Kuwait,  and the Emirates,  which  displayed
an insignificant or indeed negative consumption response to the terms-of-trade shock.  However, the
former  three countries were not really  oil exporters  before the first  oil price shock, which  consequently  had
a smaDler  positive impact on their wealth. For Kuwait and the Emirates,  the shock seems to have induced
a large  increase  in the consumption  of leisure,  made up for by extensive immigration which pushed down
average  levels of consumption  per capita. The data also suggests government consumption  may respond
almost  twice as strongly  as private sector  consumption,  perhaps  because govemments  systematically  view
shocks as more permanent than is the case.  Numerically,  panel estimates suggest the 95% confidence
interval (0.310, 0.426) for the elasticity of consumption with respect to the terms of trade.
Given the lack of an impact on savings, and the strong response of investment, the trade balance and
current  account  should be expected  to decrease,  and without  exception  these  were the estimated  responses.
C.  Nontradable  Prices and Quantities
Terms-of-trade  shocks are very  strongly  associated  with real exchange rate appreciation,  i.e., increases  in
the relative  price of nontradables. Panel estimates  of the elasticity  suggest the 95% confidence interval (-page 16
0.606,  -0.695),  and  only  Congo  displayed  an insignificant  response.  The shocks  are also  associated  with
significant  increase  in value  added  within  each  category  of nontradables.  This  confirms  the importance
of spending  effects  as a key mechanism  in the transmission  of terms-of-trade  shocks  to the rest of the
economy:  higher  wealth  leads  to greater  demand  for nontradables,  and  hence  to an increase  in their  relative
prices  and  quantities.  At a country  level,  the main  exception  was  Ecuador,  which  displayed  insignificant
responses  in the value  added  of each  nontradable  sector.
D. Dutch  Disease  Effects
The  literature  strongly  focuses  on Dutch  Disease  effects;  here,  the two non-oil  tradables  (agriculare and
manufacturing)  are the closest  approximation  we have  to a Dutch  Disease  sector. Yet  we failed  to detect
clear  contractions  in either  of them  in response  to a rise in the price  of oil;  the only  exception  was  Nigerian
agriculture.  Oil  value  added  did  respond  negatively  over  the  subperiod  1965-198  1,  but this simply  reflects
the imposition  of OPEC quotas:  the oil sector  is best not viewed  as facing  exogenously  given  terms  of
trade,  since  part  of OPEC's  strategy  at the time  clearly  was  to engineer  price  rises  by restraining  output.
The  absence  of Dutch  Disease  effects  may  be partly  explained  by either  the compression  in the output  of
the oil sector,  or by its typically  being  an 'enclave'  sector  which  does not participate  in domestic  factor
markets.  Both  factors  would  act  to reduce  the pull  of resources  away  from  other  sectors,  as mentioned  in
the theoretical  section.  Nevertheless,  as  discussed  above,  the spending  effect  was  operational,  increasing
relative  prices  and output  in the nontradable  sector. To the extent  that the nontradable  sector  may  be
competing  with  agriculture  and manufacturing  for scarce  factors  of production,  or if  nontradables  are
themselves  intermediate  inputs into other  sectors,  one might  have  expected  a small  bout of the Dutch
Disease.
E. Growth
Given  that  the  relative  prices  between  oil and  other  products  changed  so  dramatically  over  the period,  and
that the  oil sector  is so important  in our  sample,  extremely  serious  index  number  problems  arise  in even
defining  and measung  aggregate  output. We therefore feel that it is not analytically  useful to talk about
the aggregate  economy,  and we instead  separate  the oil from  the non-oil  sector. The former  has already
been mentioned.  In the non-oil  aggregate,  we  do see an effect  on GDP,  driven  mainly  by the expansionpage 17
in nontradables;  Ecuador  and Nigeria  were the only countries  with insignificant  responses. Given  our
evidence  on investment,  this response  is  best  seen  as being  driven  by capital  formation  in the nontradable
sector. Numerically,  panel  esimates of the elasticity  of non-oil  value  added  with  respect  to the terms  of
trade suggest  the 95% confidence  interval  (0.206,  0.297). This is however  influenced  by outliers;  the
median  elasticity  from the country  regressions  is 0.381.
VI. Some  Warnings regarding Extrapolation
When interpreting  and above  aU  extrapolating  our results,  several  issues  must  be considered. First,  the
causes  of the oil price  shock were different  from the causes  of the forecast  future  increase in primary
commodity  prices. IJ our sample  export prices rose because  of oligopolistic  coordination  aimed at
reducing  output. Some  responses  might  well  be different  for a truly  exogenous  terms-of-trade  shock.  In
particular,  both investment  and output  in the favored  sector  would  probably  rise; since output  was no
longer  constrained,  we should  also expect  a bigger  increase  in wealth  and  hence  consumption.
Second,  our  results  need  only  be valid  for  a permanent  change  in the terms  of trade.  A temporary  terms-of-
trade  shock  may lead  to some  intertemporal  substitution  in consumption  and  investment,  but is unlikely
to cause  a permanent  change  in output.
Third,  an economy's  response  to an increase  in the  price  of primary  commodities  will  clearly  hinge  on how
dependent  it is on primary  exports. Its investment  response  will also  depend  on what share  of its capital
goods  is imported.
Fourth,  we  might  expect  the availability  of external  finance  to be a crucial  factor  interacting  with changes
in the terms of trade,  and oil exporters  in the 1970's  probably  enjoyed  better  access  to the world  capital
markets an  is true  of the developing  world  today.  On the other  hand,  this may well  change  if the trends
in commodity  prices  change.
Fifth, in the 1970's  and 1980's  oil-exporters  wasted  a lot of their  windfall  revenues  on prestige  projects
with little impact  on output. Presumably,  developing  countries  have  by now  learnt  the lesson,  and next
time  around  will  make  better  use of their  luck.page 18
VII. Conclusions
We  considered  a panel  of oil-exporters  that  import  a significant  fraction  of their capital  goods. We  found
that  permanent  terms-of-trade  shocks  have  no impact  on savings,  a strong  positive  impact  on investment,
and a negative  impact  on the current  account. There is also  evidence  of a long-run  effect  on output,
particularly  of non-tradables.  Real  exchange-rate  appreciations  are a key mechanism  in triggering  the
resource  reallocation.  We  failed  to find any evidence  that the Dutch  disease  is a major  phenomenon.
Finally, the response  of expenditure  to terms-of-trade  shocks is not very sensitive  to whether  the
expenditure  comes  from  the  public  or private  sector.
As  discussed  in section  VL  estimating  an in-sample  response  to a terms-of-trade  shock  is much  easier  than
forecasting  an out-of-sample  response.  While  our qualitative  results  may  hold in quite  general  contexts,
our quantitative  estimates  almost  certainly  will not. Let us nevertheless  try to obtain  some  idea  of the
potential  impact  of the  forecast  increase  in commodity  prices  on the growth  rate  of commodity  exporters.
As  a lower-bound  scenario,  assume  that  the  commodity  sector  does  not  grow  at all,  that  the  non-commodity
sector  accounts  for  75%  of GDP,  and  that it responds  like  the non-oil  sector  in our sample. An increase
in the trend  growth  rate  of  commodity  prices  from  -1.5%  p.a to 0.7%  p.a. then implies  an increase  in the
order  of 0.6%  in the trend  growth  rate  of  per capita  GDP  at constant  prices. To  the extent  that  commodity
output  increases,  and  that  this  does  not pull  resources  away  from  the rest  of the economy,  the growth  effect
is magnified.page 19
Appendix I: Full Data Description and Sources.
We consider the period 1965-1989. Our sample consists of the 18 oil-exporters  listed below.
Algeria  Gabon  Mexico  Trinidad and Tobago
Bahrain  Indonesia  Nigeria  United Arab Emirates
Congo  hran  Oman  Venezuela
Ecuador  Lrq  Saudi Arabia
Egypt  Kuwait  Syria
For all countries, fuels accounted  for over 50% of total exports over at least half the sample period; for
most countries, fuels accounted for over 70% of total exports over at least three quarters of the sample
period. We used data on the following  variables:
(1)  Terms  of Trade (TOT), computed as Merchandise exports deflator US Dollar (USD) I merchandise
imnports  deflator USD, base 1987  = 1.0.
(2)  A Debt Crisis dummy (DEBT),  set to unity for Ecuador,  Mexico,  Nigeria and Venezuela  over 1982-
1989, and to zero elsewhere.
(3)  World Real Interest Rates (INTRATE),  as computed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin.
(4)  The Real Exchange Rate (REALEXRA), or relative price of tradables to nontradables. This is
computed as USA GDP derlator USD I local GDP deflator USD. index 1987.
(5)  Gross Domestic  Product  (GDP),  per capita, constant 1987  market  prices,  Local Currency  Unit (LCU).
(6)  Gross National Product (GNP),  per capita, constant 1987 market  prices, LCU.
(7)  Consumption (CONS), per capita, constant 1987 prices, LCU.
(8)  Private Consumption (CONSPRIV),  per capita, constant 1987  prices, LCU.
(9)  General Government  Consumption  (CONSGOVT),  per capita, constant 1987 prices, LCU.
(10) Gross Domestic Savings (SAVINGS),  per capita, constant 1987  prices, LCU.
(11) Fixed Investment (INVT), per capita, constant 1987  prices, LCU.
(12) Private fixed Investment (INVTPRIV),  per capita, constant 1987  prices, LCU.
(13) General Government fixed Investment (INVTGOVT),  per capita, constant 1987 prices, LCU.
(14) Balance of merchandise Trade (TRADBALA),  per capita, constant 1987 prices, LCU.
(15) Value added in the Oil sector, constant prices (OILVA),  LCU.
(16) Value added in the Non-oil sector (NONOILVA),  constant prices, LCU.
(17) Value added in Agriculture  (AGRICULT),  constant prices, LCU.page 20
(18) Value  added in Manufacturing (MANUFACT),  constant prices, LCU.
(19) Value  added in Construction (CONSTRUC),  constant prices, LCU.
(20) Value  added in Public Utilities (UTILITY),  constant prices, LCU.
(21) Value added in Services (SERVICES),  constant prices, LCU.
(22) Value added in Transportation and Communications  (TRANSPORT),  constant prices, LCU.
(23) Value  added in Wholesale and Retail Trade (TRADE), constant prices, LCU.
(24) Value  added in Other Services (OTHRSERV),  constant prices, LCU.
(25) Total  Labor force (LABOR).
Variables 1, 4..  14 and 25 came from the World Ban's  DAD database (except for Mexico's terms of
trade, obtained from Mexico's central bank), and variables 2 and 3 are as described above,  They are
available for all countries for the whole period.
Variables  17, 18 and 21 were from the World  Bank's STARS  database, and all other variables came from
World Bank Country  Economic Memoranda. They were not available for Iraq, nor before 1969.
In all cases, the ultimate  sources are national  central banks, national statistical services, and estimates by
World Bank missions.page 21
Appendix I:  Full Panel Regression Results.
Table 1. Panel regression: In yi, = a,  +  1B  In  TOTi, + e, . Sample period: 1973, 1981, 1989.
Dependent variable  Terms of trade  Terms of trade T-  N 2 N
Coefficient  ratio
Ln Real exchange rate  -0.5617  -6.8338  0.5716  0.3973  54
Ln Consumption  0.3594  4.4355  0.3598  0.3917  54
Ln Private Consumption  0.3413  4.2327  0.3386  0.3898  54
Ln Govt Consumption  0.4085  4.1049  0.3250  0.4810  54
Ln Savings  0.0312  0.2177  0.0014  0.6939  54
Ln Investment  0.4780  4.3860  0.3547  0.5267  54
Ln Private Investment  0.4895  3.5540  0.2652  0.6656  54
Ln Govt Investment  0.5731  4.5936  0.3761  0.6030  54
Trade Balance  -15.1420  -2.8571  0.1936  24.9415  53
Ln GDP  -0.0123  -0.1613  0.0007  0.3689  54
Ln Oil value added  -0.3862  -1.7479  0.2763  0.9133  23
Ln Non-oil value added  0.2211  4.4454  0.7118  0.2055  23
Ln Agriculture  0.0706  0.7940  0.0220  0.3787  46
Ln Manufacturing  0.1710  1.2890  0.0767  0.5432  36
Ln Construction  0.3314  2.7997  0.4655  0.4852  25
Ln Public Utilities  0.2553  1.5724  0.2610  0.6039  21
Ln Services  0.0951  1.0117  0.0353  0.4003  46
Ln Transportation  0.1958  1.7262  0.2986  0.4323  22
Ln Trade  0.1419  0.8500  0.0936  0.5207  21
Ln Other services  0.2704  3.7993  0.6734  0.2713  22page 22
Table 2.  Panel regression:  In Yi 0 =  cc +  3,B  In TOTi, +  12 In TOTi,.I +  ..  +  E,.
Dependent  variable  Terms of trade sum  Tenns of trade T-  R2 I  N
of coefficients  ratio
Ln Real exchange rate  -0.6508  -28.7336  0.6747  0.2488  431
Ln Consumption  0.3681  12.5055  0.2766  0.3248  431
Ln Private  Consumption  0.2902  10.2829  0.2105  0.3114  431
Ln Govt Consumption  0.5206  12.9296  0.2892  0.4442  431
Ln Savings  -0.0679  -1.1228  0.0636  0.6660  429
Ln Investment  0.5875  13.1991  0.3217  0.4706  413
Ln Private Investment  0.6831  11.7508  0.2902  0.6146  413
Ln Govt Investment  0.5970  12.3281  0.2874  0.5120  413
Trade Balance  -15.4053  -9.2591  0.2145  15.9832  395
Ln GDP  -0.0201  -0.7378  0.0158  0.3000  431
Ln Oil value added  -0.3640  -6.3850  0.2470  0.3548  178
Ln Non-oil  value added  0.2519  10.8723  0.4316  0.1441  178
Ln Agriculture  0.0701  2.2620  0.0691  0.2155  293
Ln Manufacturing  0.2306  3.7061  0.0803  0.4022  240
Ln Construction  0.3967  9.1806  0.3581  0.2709  193
Ln Public Utilities  0.3163  6.3042  0.3226  0.2787  158
Ln Services  0.0965  2.7620  0.0276  0.2438  293
Ln Transportation  0.2332  5.4244  0.1758  0.2467  175
Ln Trade  0.2331  4.6300  0.1578  0.2382  158
Ln Other services  0.2606  9.7659  0.3833  0.1531  175
For the real  exchange  rate, the trade balance, non-oil  value added, agriculture,  construction,  utilities, and
trade, the regressor matrix also includes DEBTj,;  in all the investment equations, it also includes DEBT 21
and In LNTRATE,. Sample period:  1965-1989.page 23
Table 3.  Panel Regression: In y, 1 =  oc  +  01 In TOT,, +  132 In TOT,,., +  ..  +  ell.  coeficients
unrestricted  across the subperiods 1965-1980  and 1981-1989.
Dependent variable  Terms of trade  Terms of trade  P-value for  R2 N
sum of coef.  sum of coef.  coef.
1965-1980  1981-1989  stability
Ln Real exchange rate  -0.6746  -0.5484  0.0235  0.6807  0.2471  431
Ln Consumption  0.3791  0.3110  0.25  0.2815  0.3245  431
La Private  Consumption  0.3042  0.2276  0.403  0.2140  0.3115  431
Ln Govt Consumption  0.5395  0.4211  0.0931  0.2974  0.4428  431
Ln Savings  -0.1439  0.1884  0.0894  0.0747  0.6637  429
Ln Investment  0.3124  0.3510  0  0.4505  0.4253  413
Ln Private Investment  0.4647  0.1246  0  0.3689  0.5819  413
Ln Govt Investment  0.2590  0.6564  0  0.4226  0.4627  413
Trade Balance  -16.9939  -10.9972  0.419  0.2181  15.9906  395
Ln GDP  -0.0488  0.0699  0.0893  0.0274  0.2990  431
Ln Oil value added  -0.4854  -0.0789  0.0258  0.2807  0.3491  178
Ln Non-oil  value added  0.2449  0.2710  0.703  0.4341  0.1448  178
Ln Agriculture  0.1125  0.0087  0.259  0.0784  0.2153  293
Ln Manufacturng  0.2021  0.2877  0.281  0.0908  0.4018  240
Ln Construction  0.3898  0.4083  0.76  0.3601  0.2721  193
Ln Public Utilities  0.3213  0.3142  0.713  0.3258  0.2802  158
Ln Services  0.0842  0.1241  0.399  0.0341  0.2439  293
Ln Transportation  0.1601  0.4157  0.0798  0.2020  0.2445  175
Ln Trade  0.2396  0.2250  0.936  0.1585  0.2400  158
Ln Other services  0.2597  0.2674  0.53  0.3883  0.1536  175
For the real exchange  rate, the trade balance,  non-oil value added, agriculture,  construction, utilities, and
trade, the regressor matrix also includes  DEBTk;  in all the investment  equations, it also includes DEBT,,
and In INTRATE.  Sample period: 1965-1980,  and 1981-1989. The P-value denotes the minimum
significance  level at which we can reject the null hypothesis  of identical  terms-of-trade  coefficients  across
subperiods,  using the F-test described  in Hsiao (1986), ch. 2.2, equation 2.2.20.page 24
Table  4. Share  of capital  goods  in total  inports  in 1973,  in 1981,  and  in  the latest  avaiable  year  up  to 1989
inclusive.
Share  of capital  goods  in the  year  Latest  available  year-
Country  1973  1981  Latest  1989  if not  stated
Algeria  0.3720  0.3834  0.2570
Congo  0.3868  0.3874  0.3620  1986
Ecuador  0.4117  0.4582  0.3397
Egypt  0.2477  0.2816  0.2303
Gabon  0.4066  0.4094  0.4009  1983
Indonesia  0.4104  0.3536  0.3774
Iran  0.3779  0.2832  0.3884  1983
Iraq  0.3297  0.5328  0.4478  1983
Kuwait  0.3442  0.4103  0.2961
Mexico  0.4438  0.4707  0.3260
Nigeria  0.4012  0.4402  0.3812  1986
Oman  0.3101  0.3908  0.3685
Saudi  Arabia  0.3524  0.4047  0.3870
Syria  0.2369  0.2171  0.2592  1986
Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.1313  0.2242  0.2729
United  Arab  Emirates  0.3801  0.3568  0.3025  1986
Venezuela  OA688  0.4344  0.4682  1988page 25
Appendix  III: Country-by-country  Regression  Results.
Sample  period: 1965-1989.  For each  dependent  variable,  two regressions  are  carried  out.
Regression  1: In  yj, = uxi  +  P(L)  In xk,  + e, 1, j identical  across  countries.  Results  are in the form:
Y variable  TOT  Coef  TOT  T-stat  Debt  Coef  Debt  T-stat  IntRate  Coef IntRate  T-stat
R 2 a  N  P-value
Regression  2: In  yt =  a; + 3  P(L)  In  xt + ej,,  ,B  unrestrcted  across  countries.  Results  are in the form:
Country  TOT  Coef  TOT  T-stat  Debt  Coef  Debt  T-stat  IntRate  Coef IntRate  T-stat
R 2 a  N  P-value
The P-value  in regression  I refers  to the Lagange Multiplier  test  of the null  hypothesis  of no country-
specific  effects;  the P-value  in regression  2 to the  F-test  of  the null  hypothesis  of  coefficient  stability  across
countries. Where  a coefficient  and its T-statistic  are not reported,  the corresponding  variable  was not
included  in the regression.
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